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Abstract: Following Amartya Sen's approach, John Davis and Solange Regina
Marin look at individual and social reasoning when examining the complex
relationship between identity and democracy. They characterize democracy as
a process of social or public reasoning that combines the individual reasoning
of all citizens. Identity is explained in terms of personal identity, social
identity, and individual identity. They argue that democracy in combining the
individual reasoning of all citizens responds to individuals’ different personal
identity concerns and needs, reflects their shared social identity interests and
goals, and accords them rights and responsibilities associated with their many
different individual identities.
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Introduction
Sen writes: ‘Rationality is … the discipline of subjecting one's
choices – of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities – to
reasoned scrutiny’ (Sen, 2000b: 4). To say what is rational for us to
choose, we need to examine our underlying reasons, and also our
objectives, values, and priorities. Or, we need to determine whether
our reasons for acting are ‘really sustainable’ where this includes ‘the
critical sustainability’ of our objectives, values, and priorities (Sen,
2007). But how does one scrutinize one's objectives, values, and
priorities? Sen does not believe this goes on in a personal vacuum with
the individual cut off from others. Yet, if we engage in selfexamination of our reasons for acting, we are somehow independently
responsible for our choices. How are these two sides to determining
‘the critical sustainability’ of our objectives, values, and priorities
reconciled?
In this paper, we examine these questions in relation to
individual and social reasoning, interpreted in terms of the relationship
between identity and democracy. Democracy is understood as a
process of social reasoning, which combines the individual reasoning of
all citizens. Identity is seen in terms of personal identity, social
identity, and individual identity. Democracy as a process of social
reasoning combines the individual reasoning of all citizens, responds to
individuals’ different personal identity concerns, reflects their shared
social identity interests and goals, and accords them rights and
responsibilities associated with their different individual identities.

Democracy
Sen's capability perspective is an approach for evaluating a
person's well-being, which has its own philosophical justification of the
choice of weights of indicators of functionings and capabilities.
According to Deneulin and Stewart (2002), Sen justifies them by an
evaluative exercise. He proposes a pluralist and contextual account for
assessing people's well-being, allowing for democratic processes in the
selection of functionings. He does not prescribe a list of these; every
evaluative exercise requires selection by an ‘act of reasoning’
(Robeyns, 2000: 14).
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A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one's own
consumption, experience and appreciate one's welfare, and have one's
goals, but also an entity that can examine one's value and objectives
and choose in the light of those values and objectives. (Sen, 2002b:
36)
Sen's argument makes political and liberal rights important to
the process of reasoning and self-scrutiny. He (1999b) argues that in
regard to the relationship between democracy and economic growth
the important issue is the impact of democracy and political freedoms
on the lives and capabilities of citizens. It is relevant to examine the
connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the
prevention of major disasters, on the other, because political and civil
rights give people the opportunity to draw attention to general needs,
and demand appropriate public action (Sen, 1999b: 150).
The demand for appropriate public action is related to
understanding individuals as agents. Greater freedom enhances
people's ability to help themselves and influence the world, and this is
central to economic development (Sen, 1999b: 18). The term ‘agent’
is used to mean someone who acts and brings about change, and
whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of external criteria
as well (Sen, 1999b: 19).
One of Sen's strongest arguments for political freedom is the
opportunity it gives citizens to discuss, debate, and participate in the
selection of values in the choice of priorities. Sen (1999b: 153)
emphasizes that political and civil rights, especially those related to
guaranteeing open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, are
central to the process of generating informed and reflective choice.
The social choices individuals make allow for social value formation.
The exercise of freedom is mediated by values, but values in turn are
influenced by public discussion and social interaction, which are
themselves influenced by participatory freedoms. Each of these
connections deserves careful scrutiny (Sen, 1999b: 9). Social value
formation thus relies also on democracy, free public media, and basic
education (Sen, 1999b, 2002b).
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Sen's connection between political freedom and economic
development invites one to consider what can be understood by
democracy and its relation to individuals’ agency. For Sen (1999a), we
must not identify democracy with majority rule alone, as it has many
complex demands, including voting and respect for election results,
but also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for
legal entitlements, and guaranteeing free discussions and uncensored
distribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be defective
if they occur without giving different sides adequate opportunity to
present their respective cases, or without giving the electorate
freedom to obtain news and to consider competing views.
For Sen (1999a), democracy makes three distinct contributions:
(i) it enriches individual lives through more freedom (involving political
and civil rights); (ii) it provides political incentives to rulers to respond
positively to the needs and demands of people; and (iii) the process of
open dialogue and debate democracy helps in the formation of values
and priorities, and this constructive function of democracy is very
important for equity and justice as well as efficiency.
The process of decision-making through discussion enhances
information about a society's and individuals’ priorities, and those
priorities respond to public deliberation. Sen (2003: 29) emphasizes
that from the perspective of public reasoning, democracy gives a
central place to guaranteeing free public discussion and deliberative
interactions in political thought and practice. The value of public
reasoning applies to reasoning about democracy itself. It is good that
the practices of democracy have been sharply scrutinized in the
literature on world affairs, for there are identifiable deficiencies in the
performance of many countries possessing standard democratic
institutions. Not only is public discussion of these deficiencies an
effective means of trying to remedy them, but this is how democracy
in the form of public reasoning is meant to function. In this sense, the
defects of democracy demand more democracy, not less (2003: 34).
Sen (2005b) believes public reasoning: (i) involves respect for
pluralism and tolerance for different points of view and lifestyles; (ii)
demands an open public discussion of issues of common concern; and
(iii) encourages political commitment and participation of people in
public action for the transformation of society. There are reasons for
Development, Vol 52, No. 4 (December 2009): pg. 500-508. DOI. This article is © Palgrave Macmillan and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave Macmillan does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Palgrave
Macmillan.

4

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Sen's life-long engagement and confidence in democracy, which are
explained by three major contributions democracy makes to a country.
First, as political freedom is an important freedom, the freedom to
participate, to speak, and to vote is part and parcel of human freedom
we have reason to value. Second, a democratic political system is
instrumentally important, because it gives rulers incentives to respond
to problems and predicaments of the public (the government must
take a note of opposition criticism as well as possible electoral defeat),
and because information becomes more easily available and shared
with democratic practice. Third, through allowing and encouraging
public discussion, democratic political systems help the formation of
values.
Sen (2002a: 15) believes that participation not only has an
instrumental role but also an intrinsic value for the quality of life.
Being able to do something through political action – for oneself or
others – is one of the elementary freedoms people have reason to
value. Sen (2002a: 27) emphasizes that democracy is not the same
thing as majority rule, as democratic rights include the protection of
freedom of speech and other forms of participation as well as
safeguarding of minority rights. Beyond that, it is worth noting that
the process of public discussion and participatory interaction lead
citizens to take an interest in the lives of each other.

Identity
We distinguish three concepts of identity – personal, social, and
individual. We compare these identity concepts in pair-wise fashion
primarily to explain the relationship between personal identity and
social identity. Sen's own emphasis is on social identity (1999c, 2006),
though it can be argued he also reasons in terms of something like
personal identity (Davis, 2007). Our starting point is also social
identity, since we believe the individual in economics needs to be
understood as socially embedded rather than atomistic (Davis, 2003).
As the individual is always social, personal identity must be understood
in terms of social identity. Thus we first suppose that individuals have
social identities, and develop the other two identity concepts from this.
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Social identity and individual identity
Social identity is the idea of individuals’ identification with others
– other individuals or social groups. In the first case, social identity
involves an individual-individual relationship, as in identifying with
particular friends, family members, etc. In the second case, social
identity is an individual-group relationship, as in identifying with
groups according to such things as language, ethnicity, religion, work,
etc.
Whether social identity takes the individuals (or relational) form
or the group form, individuals’ identification with others has different
senses depending on who is responsible for the identification.
Individuals themselves can identify with others, or can be identified
with others by third parties. Thus, there are four types of social
identity: (1) individuals themselves identify with other individuals; (2)
individuals themselves identify with groups; (3) individuals are
identified with others by third parties; and (4) individuals are identified
with groups by third parties. Examples are: (1) a person identifies with
a sick friend; (2) an immigrant identifies with a native language group;
(3) social service workers socially identify individuals according to
family relationships; and (4) statisticians socially identify individuals
according to race and ethnicity.
Analyzing how individuals identify with others raises complex
psychological issues, which we put aside here. When individuals are
identified with others by third parties, this identification is systematic
and public, as the third parties concerned are relatively enduring social
entities such as government, market institutions, media and popular
discourse, and social science. Important emphasis in this third party
construction of individuals’ social identities concerns the group form, in
that these socially constructed social identities are generally built
around social group categories, or generalizations about collections of
individuals, that are functional to the social organization of increasingly
complex societies. But they also result from social conflict and the
efforts of individuals and groups to exercise power over one another.
Individual identity is a correlate of the third party-social group
concept of social identity used to describe the representative
individual. Individual identity thus understood is a matter of the
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individual falling within a class of individuals corresponding to a social
group category, resulting from ascription of characteristics of the class
to the individual. Individual identity concepts created for social
organizational reasons include: tax payer, degree holder, pension
earner, medical patient, and citizen. Individual identity concepts
generated from social conflict and efforts to exercise power include:
trade union member, immigrant, welfare recipient, insider trader, and
terrorist.
An important dimension of third party concepts of social identity
and individual identity is the need for stability in their application.
Social group categories are designed to pick out patterns of social life
believed stable. Tax and pension systems, practices of discrimination
and methods of social exclusion, medical service delivery, penal codes,
personnel files and educational records, etc. function as social tools
used to pick out stable patterns of social behaviour. This requires
consistency in the assignment of individuals to social groups. Thus,
though many of a person's income and employment characteristics
change over time, that person, nonetheless, retains an unchanging
individual identity as taxpayer and future pension recipient. Or, though
a person's health states change over a lifetime, that person's medical
history individual identity is not to be confused with another person's.
Accompanying most social group categories, there are
‘continuity’ tracking technologies that operationalize individual
identities: names, number assignments, individualized records of all
kinds, family descent, curriculum vitae, photographs, biometric
measures (fingerprints, DNA identification, dental records, brain scans,
iris scans), surveillance, and incarceration or institutionalization. As
social group categories allow for managing large, heterogeneous
populations of individuals according to functional relationships believed
to obtain between them, these tracking tools provide practical working
systems for these categories’ consistent application. Philosophically,
social group categories require tools to successfully re-identify and
individuate individuals in terms of the social group characteristics that
consistently and uniquely apply to them (Davis, 2003).
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Individual identity and personal identity
We assume that individuals are not only objects in the sense
defined by third parties, but following Sen, also agents or subjects. We
further assume that being an agent or subject is part of the concept of
personal identity. Individual identity is purely an object
characterization of individuals in terms of being a member of a
category or class of things, and not a concept of personal identity. As
individual identity is derived from the third party-social group concept
of social identity, it leaves out what the first three types of social
identity contribute to understanding personal identity, specifically, the
role played by individuals themselves in identifying with others
(individuals or groups), and the role played by their being identified
with other individuals by third parties.
This does not imply that people's individual identities are not a
part of their personal identities. We suppose personal identity
incorporates all four aspects of an individual's social identity, including
the many group membership individual identities ascribed to
individuals by third parties, since an individual's personal identity does
not exist in a social vacuum apart from the characteristics society
attributes to the individual as a member of social groups. This also
applies to the type of social identity produced when third parties
identify individuals with other individuals, as in the social worker case.
That others judge a person to have close social relationships to others,
and see this as part of that person's social identity is not irrelevant to
a person's personal identity. Generally, what others think of a person's
relationships to individuals and groups influences what the person
thinks about those relationships. Thus, we say that an individual's
personal identity incorporates their own identification with other
individuals and groups, as influenced by what third parties think about
this, and all four types of social identity enter into personal identity.
We focus only on the relationship between individual identity
and personal identity, or the rows of the table. First consider the
difference between the two third party ascriptions of social identity.
With type 3, the social worker case, a person's social identity is a
matter of an individual-individual(s) relationship, or social identity is
relational. With type 4, however, the person is simply a member of a
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class, and only a representative member at that. The statistician who
ascribes a racial or ethnic social identity to a person is only interested
in an abstract, non-relational property the individual has as a member
of a class of such individuals. In effect, type 4 social identity reduces
the person to an abstract object.1
Type 4 social identity can be seen as the polar opposite of the
case of identifying with a sick friend, type 1, since there the individual
determines the identification with the other, and this is an individualto-individual or relational kind of identification rather than
identification with a social group category. Accordingly, on the
assumption that idea of being an agent or subject is part of the
concept of personal identity, individuals are the most responsible for
their personal identities in type 1 cases, where they determine their
identification with others and do so in interaction with others, and least
responsible in type 4 cases.
Yet, all four types of social identity somehow enter into personal
identity, and must include this especially strong polarity of being both
a subject and a third party object. For example, a person can identify
with a set of friends, and regard it as irrelevant they are of another
racial or ethnic background (type 1), yet the social identity which the
government statistician might emphasize may be restricted to the
person's own racial or ethnic background or other groups’
characteristics ‘officially’ assigned to the individual (type 4). Real world
examples are more complicated, since the government statistician is
only one of many third parties who assign individuals social group
identities, and these group identities are often inconsistent and
competing, particularly where power is contested. Thus just
considering type 4 social identity alone, inherent within individuals’
personal identities, there exist many social identity conflicts according
to competing social group assignments individuals must reconcile. If
we add in the type 2 and type 3 social identity cases, the general
picture is: personal identity is constituted within a social identity
structure replete with conflicting demands and expectations individuals
need to organize for their lives to be coherent.
Thus personal identity includes the idea of being an agent, and
individuals need to be seen as active in negotiating their complex and
conflicting social identities to achieve some level of unity as an
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individual. Broadly, we define personal identity as individuals’ own way
of negotiating and organizing all their social identities. This view links
up with two important dimensions of Sen's thinking about individuals.
It sees individuals as agents, and requires individuals to be selfscrutinizing or reflexive. Thus a fuller definition of personal identity is
an individuals’ active and reflexive negotiation of their complex social
identities.

Personal identity and social identity
Personal identity and social identity are not opposed (as with
atomistic individual conceptions), but for socially embedded individuals
are defined in terms of one another. Personal identity is defined in
terms of social identity, or how individuals relate to others, yet not
reducible to it since it emphasizes the idea of the individual as a
reflexive agent. Social identity in its different dimensions is always
about the identity of individuals, yet not reducible to this, since it
includes third party determination.
If we associate individual reasoning and social reasoning with
the two rows of Table 1, they are not seen as opposed either.
Individual reasoning and social reasoning, of course, include more
than just issues of identity. Yet questions of identity are surely
paramount, since they arise whenever individuals and society say what
individuals are, and whose reasoning combines to produce social
reasoning.
Table 1. Types of social identity with examples
Who determines

Identification with
Individuals

Individuals themselves (1) Sick friend
Third parties

Groups
(2) Native language

(3) Social service workers (4) Statisticians

Here we focus on claims about well-being, and understand them
in terms of individual and social reasoning as they relate to the
concepts of personal and social identity. There are two approaches to
individual well-being in recent economics, often taken to be opposed.
The happiness or subjective well-being approach (e.g., Diener and
Seligman, 2003; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) emphasizes
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individuals’ own assessment of their well-being (usually in hedonistic
terms), and the quality of life or objective well-being approach (e.g.,
Sen, 1993; Offer, 2003) emphasizes socially determined requirements
for a good life (such as capabilities). That individual and social
reasoning are related suggests we should combine these different
perspectives. We use our identity framework to do this, and also
demonstrate the connection between personal identity and social
identity.
In the identity framework, the strong polarity between an
individual being a subject and being a third party object replicates the
opposition between subjective and objective approaches to individual
well-being. But as personal identity is a matter of managing the
different dimensions of social identity, individual well-being also has
both subjective and objective dimensions. Beginning with the objective
dimension, a person's individual identities (type 4 social identity) are
due to the efforts of third party experts to establish applicable
categories of well-being. For example, consider those responsible for
the creation of the Human Development Index (HDI). Their aim is to
establish such categories of well-being as literacy, income, health,
shelter, etc. that average individuals should achieve as capabilities.
Public policy then works to change institutions and create access to
resources to realize these ‘average capabilities’.
But now consider the subjective dimension of individual wellbeing. As Sen emphasizes, different individuals use resources in
different ways. Further, as people have many capabilities, how they
combine any given set of individual identities in the form of a set of
‘average capabilities’ that applies to them varies for each individual
according to circumstances. Thus, personal identity in regard to wellbeing is a matter of how individuals negotiate their many ‘average
capabilities’ individual identities (here only emphasizing the strong
polarity between being a subject and being an object of third party
reasoning). This brings in the subjective side of well-being in terms of
individuals’ own assessment of their well-being to bear on the issue of
individual well-being (though not in the hedonistic happiness sense).
Do individuals’ assessments of their well-being influence third
party experts’ assessment of individual well-being? Experts are
subjects too, so when not in that guise, they are also concerned about
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their personal identities in the space of social identity, and accordingly
must reason about the methodology of the social categories with which
they operate. This large topic, however, goes beyond our focus on
personal identity and social identity.
In sum, the advantages of casting individual and social
reasoning in terms of personal and social identity are that we explain
this reasoning in terms of the dual nature of human beings as subjects
and objects, and make it possible to refine our normative thinking in
economics, as in the characterization of individual well-being.

Democracy and identity
Social reasoning takes many forms as regards particular aspects
of social-political systems and with respect to systems taken as a
whole. In addressing democracy we take the latter stance, and
characterize social reasoning like Sen as public reasoning. Sen takes
public reasoning as a defining feature of democracy, which he takes as
a system of open engagement and exchange in political decisionmaking. How, then, does democracy relate to identity?
The previous analysis treats personal and social identity as
interrelated. Individuals pursue personal identities framed by their
social identities, and influence the framing of social identities, thus
reflecting their dual nature as subjects and objects. Democracy, as a
form of social reasoning, frames individuals’ political social identities,
while as a system of public reasoning it responds to and exhibits
individuals’ negotiation of their many social identities in pursuit of their
respective personal identities.
On the one hand, as a system of social identity framing,
democracy invests individuals with political and civil rights, creating
the social category of ‘citizen’ and a corresponding individual identity
for each individual framed in terms of these rights. These rights define
a scope of activity applying to all individuals who fall into the social
group category ‘citizen’. That a right applies to all falling within this
category means that the principle of equality in a political system is an
outcome made possible in part by third party determination of one
aspect of individuals’ social identity.
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On the other hand, just as Sen reminds us that different
individuals use resources in different ways, so different individuals
exercise their ‘citizen’ political and civil rights in different ways as they
negotiate their many social identities and associated individual
identities. Democracy itself, then, is framed by individuals as a process
of open engagement and exchange that allow individual exercise of
political and civil rights. This influences society's determination of what
rights and capabilities individuals on average ought to have. For
example, if individuals have the right to religious freedom, but many
individuals are non-believers, the right to religious freedom is
interpreted to include non-belief. ‘Citizen’ rights are thus like the
‘average capabilities’ of the HDI. Their exercise both determines which
individual functionings make up the political side of individuals’ social
identities, and contributes to the social determination of which rights
and capabilities individuals on average have.

Essential capabilities
We turn to the issue of essential capabilities. Nussbaum (2000,
2003) has argued that the capability approach requires a list of central
human capabilities. Sen has argued one cannot fix such a list, because
we cannot anticipate what future individuals will value, and it would be
a denial of democracy to do so (2005a). Robeyns (2003) strikes a
middle ground by recommending a procedural approach to selecting
capabilities by proposing criteria for capability selection. We agree with
Nussbaum that having a conception of human flourishing is important,
with Sen that this needs to be determined in a democratic setting, and
with Robeyns that normative criteria exist for different societies’
selection of capabilities. Our view is based on the relationship between
individual and social reasoning and between identity and democracy.
As argued, individuals pursue personal identities framed by their
social identities, and thus combine individual and social reasoning. The
pursuit of personal identity, however, is surely a conception of human
flourishing, as it involves individuals determining what they believe
best for them. At the same time, what exactly this involves must
remain open-ended as individuals’ collection of social identities and
forms of interaction changes over time. Nonetheless in democratic
societies with their systems of public reasoning, procedural criteria for
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the way individual and social reasoning combine exist in the form of
strategies for open engagement and exchange. Systems of public
reasoning, then, maximize the capability space, and allow individuals
the opportunities to acquire the functionings they determine are best
for them. Thus Nussbaum's vision strikes us as correct, Sen is right
about the open-ended character of capability selection, and Robeyns
captures the need for criteria for doing so. We summarize our view by
labelling personal identity the central capability of individuals. By this
we mean that it is the one capability that must be assumed to assure
both human flourishing and open-endedness in individuals’ selection of
other capabilities.

Conclusion
Sen emphasizes the importance of subjecting one's choices of
actions, objectives, values, and priorities to reasoned scrutiny.
Individuals do not do this in isolation and yet a reasoned scrutiny of
one's actions, objectives, values, and priorities is a matter of selfscrutiny. These seemingly opposed ideas make sense if we begin by
thinking of individuals as social. We explain social individuals as
individuals who pursue personal identities framed by their social
identities. Neither concept is reducible to the other, nor can either be
eliminated. At the same time, the identity framework used here shows
individual well-being has subjective and objective dimensions. This
makes it possible to talk about social individuals as individual beings,
while it reproduces the tension between the individual and the social
within the individual in individuals’ need to organize and manage their
many social identities. This tension and the dynamic of choice and
action to which it gives rise in individuals and societies precludes our
saying what capabilities ought to be thought essential – with one
exception. If individuals are constrained in pursuing personal
identities, their social side engulfs them. Open democratic societies,
however, can prevent this, and permit individual human flourishing in
the form of the exercise of a wide range of human capabilities.

Footnotes
In case 3, in contrast, individuals have specific relations to other
individuals, the understanding of which requires knowledge of their

1
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particular characteristics. We do not further discuss this relational
aspect of social identity (cases1and 3) here.
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